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A
general prescription of economic theory is that taxes on capital in-
come are bad. That is, a robust feature of a large variety of models
is that a positive tax on capital income cannot be part of a long-run
optimum. This result suggests that it may be useful to search for alternatives
to taxes on capital income. Several recent proposals advocate a move to fun-
damentallyswitchthetaxbasetowardlaborincomeorconsumptionandaway
from capital income. The main point of this article is to demonstrate that, as
a quantitative matter, uninsurable idiosyncratic risk is important to consider
when contemplating alternatives to capital income taxes. Additionally, we
show that tax reforms may be viewed rather differently by households that
differ in wealth and/or current labor productivity.
We are motivated to quantitatively evaluate the risk-sharing implications
of taxes by the ﬁndings of two recent theoretical investigations. These are,
respectively, Easley, Kiefer, and Possen (1993) and Aiyagari (1995). The
work of Easley, Kiefer, and Possen (1993) develops a stylized two-period
model where households face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. Their ﬁndings
suggest that, in general, when households face uninsurable risk in the returns
to their human or physical capital, it is useful to tax the income from these
factors and then rebate the proceeds via a lump-sum rebate. However, the
framework employed in this study does not provide implications for the long-
run steady state. Conversely, Aiyagari (1995) constructs an inﬁnite-horizon
economy in which households derive value from public expenditures and face
We thank Kay Haynes for expert editorial assistance; Leo Martinez, Roy Webb, and Chris
Herrington for very helpful comments; and Andreas Hornstein for an extremely helpful editor’s
report and comments, both substantive and expositional. The views expressed in this article
are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
or the Federal Reserve System. All errors are our own.32 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
uninsurable idiosyncratic endowment risks and borrowing constraints. In this
case, the optimal long-run capital income tax rate is positive. Speciﬁcally,
Aiyagari (1995) shows that the optimal capital stock implies an interest rate
that equals the rate of time preference. However, labor income risks generate
precautionary savings that force the rate of return on capital below this rate.
Therefore, to ensure a steady state with an optimal capital stock, a social
plannerwillneedtodiscourageprivate-sectorcapitalaccumulation. Astrictly
positive long-run capital income tax rate is, therefore, sufﬁcient to ensure
optimality.1
The approach we take is to study several stylized tax reforms in a setting
thatallowsthedifferentialrisk-sharingpropertiesofalternativetaxestoplaya
roleindeterminingtheirdesirability. We,therefore,choosetoevaluateamodel
that combines features of Easley, Kiefer, and Possen (1993) with those of
Aiyagari (1995), and is rich enough to map to observed tax policy. In terms of
the experiments we perform, we study the tradeoffs involved with using either
(i) labor income or (ii) consumption taxes to replace capital income taxes.
Our work complements preceding work on tax reform by focusing attention
solelyonthedifferencesthatarisespeciﬁcallyfromtheexclusiveuseofeither
labor income taxes or consumption taxes. To our knowledge, the divergence
in allocations emerging from the use of either labor or consumption taxes
has not been investigated.2 We study a model that confronts households with
risks of empirically plausible magnitudes, and allows them to self-insure via
wealthaccumulation. Ourworkismostcloselyrelatedtothreeinﬁnite-horizon
models of tax reform studied respectively by Imrohoroglu (1998), Floden and
Linde (2001), and Domeij and Heathcote (2004). The environment that we
study is a standard inﬁnite-horizon, incomplete-markets model in the style of
Aiyagari (1994), modiﬁed to accommodate ﬁscal policy. The remainder of
the article is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the main model and
discusses the computation of equilibrium. Section 2 explains the results and
Section 3 discusses robustness and concludes the article.
1. MODEL
Thekeyfeaturesofthismodelarethathouseholdsfaceuninsurableandpurely
idiosyncratic risk, and have only a risk-free asset that they may accumulate.
For tractability, we will focus throughout the article on stationary equilibria
1Another strand of work by Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Garriga (2000) illustrates settings
in which the long-run capital income tax remains strictly postive because households face trading
frictions that arise from living in a deterministic overlapping-generations economy.
2 Imrohoroglu (1998) mentions this difference in a life-cycle model but does not discuss the
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of this model in which prices and the distribution of households over wealth
and income levels are time-invariant.
Households
The economy has a continuum of inﬁnitely lived ex ante identical households
indexed by their location i on the interval [0,1]. The size of the population
is normalized to unity, there is no aggregate uncertainty, and time is discrete.
Preferences are additively separable across consumption in different periods,











t} is a sequence of consumption, and  (a0,z 0) is the set of feasible
sequencesgiveninitialwealtha0 andproductivityz0. Topresentaﬂowbudget
constraint for the household, we proceed as follows.
Households face constant proportional taxes on labor income (τl), on
capital income (τk), and on consumption (τc).3 Households enter each period
with asset holdings ai and face pre-tax returns on capital and labor of r and
w, respectively. Each household is endowed with one unit of time, which it
supplies inelastically, that is, li = 1, and receives a lump-sum transfer b.I t
thenreceivesanidiosyncratic(i.e.,cross-sectionallyindependent)productivity
shockzi, whichleavesitwithincomewqi, whereqi ≡ ezi
. Giventhetaxeson
capital and labor income, the household comes into the period with gross-of-
interestassetholdings(1+r(1−τk)ai)andafter-taxlaborincome(1−τl)wqi.
The household’s resources, denoted yi, in a given period are then
yi = b + (1 − τl)wqi + [1 + r(1 − τk)]ai. (2)
If we denote private current-period consumption and end-of-period wealth by
ci and ai , respectively, the household’s budget constraint is
(1 + τc)ci ≤ yi − ai . (3)
The productivity shock evolves over time according to anAR(1) process
zi  = ρzi + εi, (4)
3A tax on consumption can be implemented simply via a retail sales tax, as we do here,
or via an income tax with a full deduction for any savings. See, for example, Kotlikoff (1993).34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
where ρ determines the persistence of the shock and εi
t is an i.i.d. normally
distributed random variable with mean zero and variance σ2
ε.
Stationary Recursive Household Problem
Given constant tax rates, constant government transfers, and constant prices,
thehousehold’sproblemisrecursiveintwostatevariables, a andz. Suppress-
ing the household index i, we express the stationary recursive formulation of
the household’s problem as follows:
v(a,z) = max u(c) + E[v(a ,z  )|z], (5)
subject to (2), (3), and the no-borrowing constraint:
a  ≥ 0 (6)
Given parameters (τ,b,w,r), the solution to this problem yields a deci-
sion rule for savings as a function of current assets a and current
productivity z:
a  = g(a,z|τ,b,w,r). (7)
To reduce clutter, in what follows we denote optimal asset accumulation by
the rule g(a,z) and optimal consumption by the rule c(a,z). As households
receive idiosyncratic shocks to their productivity each period, they will accu-
mulate and decumulate assets to smooth consumption. In turn, households




speciﬁcally,letP(a,z,a ,z  )denotethetransitionfunctiongoverningtheevo-
lution of distributions of households over the state space (a,z). P(a,z,a ,z  )
should be interpreted as the probability that a household that is in state (a,z)
today will move to state (a ,z  ) tomorrow. It is a function of the household
decision rule g(·), and the Markov process for income z.
We will focus, however, on stationary equilibria, whereby λt(a,z) =
λ(a,z), ∀ t. Therefore, we locate a distribution λ(a,z) that is invariant under
the transition function P(·), which requires that the following hold:
λ(a ,z  ) =

P(a,z,a ,z  )dλ. (8)
We denote the stationary marginal distributions of household character-
istics a and z by λa and λz, respectively. Given this, aggregate consumption
C ≡

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Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms that take constant factor prices as given and
employ constant-returns production in physical capital K and labor L.G i v e n
total factor productivity  , aggregate output Y then is given by a production
function:
Y = F( ,K,L). (9)
Physical capital depreciates at constant rate δ per period.
Government
There is a government that consumes an aggregate amount CG and transfers
an aggregate amount B ≡








[τlwq(z) + τkrg(a,z) + τcc(a,z)]dλ. (10)
The government’s outlays in each period are given by
G = B + CG, (11)
where CG is government consumption. The preceding collectively imply that
the economy-wide law of motion for the capital stock is given by
K  = (1 − δ)K + F( ,K,L) − C − CG. (12)
In equilibrium, T(τ,B) = G. In our model, we abstract from government
debt for two reasons. First, we wish to maintain a simpler environment and
second,theratioofpublicdebthasﬂuctuatedsubstantiallyoverthepastseveral
decades, making a single, long-run number more difﬁcult to interpret.
Equilibrium
Given constant tax rates τ = [τl τk τc], factor productivity  , government
consumption CG, and per capita transfers b, a stationary recursive compet-
itive general equilibrium for this economy is a collection of (i) a constant
capital stock K; (ii) a constant labor supply L; (iii) constant prices (w,
r); (iv) decision rules for the household g(a,z) and c(a,z); (v) a mea-
sure of households λ(a,z) over the state space; (vi) a transition function
P(a,z,a ,z  ) governing the law of motion for λ(a,z); and (vii) aggregate36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
savings A(τ,B,r,w)≡

g(a,z)dλ, such that the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
1. The decision rules solve the household’s problem described in (1).
2. The government’s budget constraint holds
G(τ,B|r,w) = T(τ,B). (13)
3. Given prices, factor allocations are competitive:
Fk( ,K,L) − δ = r, and
Fl( ,K,L) = w.
(14)
4. The aggregate supply of savings satisﬁes the ﬁrm’s demand for capital
A(τ,B,r,w)= K. (15)
5. The distribution of households over states is stationary across time:
λ(a ,z  ) =

P(a,z,a ,z  )dλ. (16)
Discussion of Stationary Equilibrium
Our focus on stationary equilibria warrants some discussion. In particular,
even if government behavior were time-invariant, there may be equilibria in
which prices faced by households vary over time in fairly complicated ways.
Unfortunately, computing such equilibria is very difﬁcult when households
face uninsurable income shocks each period. The problems arise because
even under constant prices, it is not possible that household-level outcomes
remain constant through time. In turn, the distribution of households over
wealth and productivity may vary through time. The moments of that dis-
tribution will, of course, vary as well. In such a setting, households would
have to forecast an entire sequence of cross-sectional distributions of wealth
and productivity over the inﬁnite future in order to forecast the prices needed
to optimally choose their own individual level of consumption and savings.
Given the difﬁculties previously discussed, we restrict attention to equilibria
where prices and allocations remain stationary over time. Under this simpli-
ﬁcation, households maximize their utility under a conjecture that they will
face an inﬁnite sequence of constant prices and taxes, and markets clear. In
our case, the prices, taxes, and transfers are as follows: w, r, τ = [τl τk τc],
and b, respectively.
In turn, the solution to the household optimization problem generates a
time-invariantrulethatgovernsoptimalconsumptionandsavingsasafunction
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reasonable (and indeed, often to be expected) that a household’s movements
through time will be described by a single, unique, distribution.4 Intuitively,
household decisions determine how the endogenous state variable of wealth
evolves from one period to the next. However, because future productivity
shocks are drawn at random, so is future wealth. In our model, wealth moves
through time in a way that its probability distribution one period from now
depends only on current wealth and current productivity. This type of move-
mentoccursbecauseproductivityshocksarepurelyﬁrst-orderautoregressive,
and the household wishes only to choose wealth one-period ahead. In sum,
wealth and productivity together follow a ﬁrst-order Markov process. Un-
der fairly general circumstances, the long-run behavior of such processes is
time-stationary. Namely, across any two arbitrarily chosen (but sufﬁciently
long) windows of time, the fraction of time that a household spends at any
given combination of wealth and productivity will be equal. More useful
for us, however, is that the preceding then generally implies that, across any
two dates, the fractions of any (sufﬁciently large) collection of households
with a given level of wealth and productivity will also be equal. That is, the
cross-sectionaldistributionofhouseholdsoverwealthandproductivitywillbe
time-invariant.5 If this stationary distribution also clears markets, households
are justiﬁed in taking the conjectured inﬁnite sequence of constant prices as
given.6
Measuring the Effects of Policy
The welfare criterion used here is the expectation of discounted utility taken
with respect to the invariant distribution of shocks and asset holdings, as is





distribution of households as described in (16). Let  bench denote the value
under the benchmark and  policy denote the value under an alternative policy.
Given ,wecancomparewelfareacrosspolicyregimesbycomputingthe
proportional increase/decrease to benchmark consumption that would make
4 For example, Huggett (1993) provides a proof of this for the case where households face
two levels of shocks, have unbounded utility (as we do here), and face a borrowing constraint.
5 More generally, the relevant “state-vector” will have a constant cross-sectional distribution.
6 Households only take equilibrium prices as given. If prices did not clear markets, house-
holds or ﬁrms could not rationally take them as given when optimizing. Consequently, households
or ﬁrms would have no guarantee of being able to buy (sell) the quantities they wished.
7 See, for example, Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998).38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
householdsindifferentbetweenbeingassignedaninitialstatefromthebench-
mark stationary distribution and being assigned a state according to the sta-
tionarydistributionthatprevailsundertheproposedpolicychange. Underour
assumed CRRA preferences, this is given as:




1−μ − 1. (18)
 >0 implies that the policy is welfare improving, while  <0 implies the
reverse.8
Parameterization
In the benchmark economy, the goal of the calibration is to locate the discount
rate, β∗,thatallowsthecapitalmarkettoclearatobservedfactorprices, trans-
fer levels, and tax rates. We then will use β∗ when computing outcomes in
the policy experiments. The model period is one year. We follow the work of
both Domeij and Heathcote (2000) and Floden and Linde (2001) in parame-
terizingthebenchmarkeconomy. Weobservedirectlysomeoftheparameters
associated with benchmark policy. These consist of the three tax rates mea-
sured by Domeij and Heathcote (2000) as τl = 0.269,τ k = 0.397, and
τc = 0.054, respectively.9 Lump-sum transfers as a percentage of output are
set following Floden and Linde (2001), at B
Y = 0.082. We specify production
by a Cobb-Douglas function whereby F( ,K,L) =  KαL1−α. The interest
rate,r∗ = 0.04,andcapital-outputratioof3.32followPrescott(1986). Lastly,
we set factor productivity   to normalize benchmark equilibrium wages w∗
to unity.
We assume that a is bounded below by zero in every period, which pre-
cludes borrowing. This follows the work of Floden and Linde (2001), Domeij
and Heathcote (2000), Domeij and Floden (2006), and Ventura (1999). We
restrict the households’asset holdings to the interval A=[0,A]. However, we
set A high enough that it never binds.
TheutilityfunctionisCRRAandisgivenbyu(c) = c1−μ
1−μ. Wesetμ = 2.0,
as is standard. The values governing the income process are subject to more
debate, however. We, therefore, study economies under two different levels
of earnings risk that collectively span a range of estimates documented by
Aiyagari (1994). In particular, we study a “high-risk” economy, in which
σε = 0.2, and also a “low-risk” economy, in which σε = 0.1. With respect
to the persistence of shocks, a reasonable view of the literature suggests that
8 To convert model outcomes into dollar equivalents, note that average labor income in the
model is normalized to unity, and average labor income in 2006 U.S. data is approximately
$50,000.
9 We use tax rates as measured for 1990–1996 in Domeij and Heathcote (2000), Table 2.K. B. Athreya and A. L. Waddle: Alternatives to Capital Taxes 39
ρ lies between 0.88 and 0.96. We therefore choose ρ = 0.92. The household
discounts at a rate β that, for each level of earnings risk, will be calibrated to
match aggregate capital accumulation under observed factor prices, depreci-
ation, and tax policy.
To parameterize α, δ, and  , we will use direct observations on (i) the
output-capitalratio,(ii)theinterestrater,and(iii)theshareofnationalincome
paid to labor wL
Y . First, given prices w and r, the proﬁt-maximizing levels of
capital and labor that a ﬁrm wishes to rent solve the following problem:
max KαL1−α − wL− (δ + r)K. (19)
For labor, this has the ﬁrst-order necessary condition:
(1 − α) KαL−α = w.
Multiplying both sides by L and rearranging allow us to write:




Thus, α can be inferred from the observed share of national income going
to labor. Turning next to depreciation, optimal capital has the ﬁrst-order
necessary condition:
α Kα−1L1−α = r + δ, (20)
which, after multiplying by K and rearranging, allows us to use the measured
output-capital ratio Y





Lastly, to set total factor productivity such that equilibrium wages are
normalized to unity, we use the ﬁrst-order condition for labor demand. First,
note that we must locate a value of   such that
w = (1 − α) KαL−α = 1. (21)









Substituting into (21), we have40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Parameters
Parameter Value {high, low} Source
τl
bench 0.269 Domeij and Heathcote (2000)
τk
bench 0.397 Domeij and Heathcote (2000)
τc
bench 0.054 Domeij and Heathcote (2000)
r∗
bench 0.04 Prescott (1986)
b
Y 0.082 Floden and Linde (2001)
β {0.9587,0.9673} Calibrated to clear capital mkt. at r∗
bench
μ 2.0 Standard in literature
α 0.36 Kydland and Prescott (1982)
δ 0.0685 Calibrated to match K
Y = 3.32, given α, r∗
bench
  0.865 Calibrated to match w = 1
ρ 0.92 Floden and Linde (2001)
σε {0.2,0.1} Similar to Aiyagari (1994)

















Table 1 summarizes our parameter choices.
Computation
We solve the recursive formulation of the household’s problem by apply-
ing standard discrete-state-space value-function iteration (see, for example,
Ljungqvist and Sargent [2000] 39–41). In order to do this, we ﬁrst assume
that the productivity shocks can take 25 values. We follow Tauchen (1986)
to obtain a discrete approximation of the continuous-valued process deﬁned
in (4). For assets, we use a grid of 500 unevenly spaced points for wealth,
with more points located where the value function exhibits more curvature.
In the benchmark economy, we know that prices and transfers must match the
data. Therefore, treating prices and transfers as ﬁxed, we guess a value for β,
solve the household’s problem, and obtain aggregate savings. We then iterate
on the discount factor β until we clear the capital market. Labor supply isK. B. Athreya and A. L. Waddle: Alternatives to Capital Taxes 41
inelastic, so the labor market clears by construction.10 Once we have located
a discount factor that clears the capital market, we obtain aggregate tax rev-
enue T(τ,B). 11 We then set government consumption, CG, as the residual
that allows the government budget constraint to be satisﬁed.12
For the policy experiments, note ﬁrst that our deﬁnition of revenue neu-
trality means that the revenue needed by the government is exactly the level
needed in the benchmark, as we hold both transfers and government con-
sumption ﬁxed at their benchmark levels. Given this condition, we compute
equilibria by iterating on both tax rates and the interest rate. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁrst guess an interest rate that, under the aggregate labor supply of unity, also
yields the wage rate. We then guess a tax rate and impose the precise level
of transfers obtained from the benchmark. Given these parameters, we can
solve the household’s problem, from which we obtain aggregate savings. We
thencheckwhethersavingsclearsthecapitalmarket, andifnot, weupdatethe
interest rate. Once we have found an allocation that clears the capital market,
we check whether the government’s budget constraint is satisﬁed. That is, we
check whether the market-clearing allocation found allows the government
to raise the same level of revenue as in the benchmark. If not, we adjust the
speciﬁc tax rate that is under study in a given policy experiment. We then
return to the iteration on the interest rate in order to clear the capital market.
We continue this process until we have located both an interest rate and a tax
rate whereby capital market-clearing and the government budget constraint
are both simultaneously satisﬁed.
2. RESULTS
The experiments conducted in this article compare allocations obtained in the
benchmark economy with those obtained under four alternative tax regimes.
These are regimes that raise revenue by (i) using only consumption taxes, (ii)
using only labor income taxes, (iii) eliminating labor income taxes, and (iv)
eliminatingconsumptiontaxes. Theresultsarethenpresentedintwosections.
First, we study aggregate outcomes alone. Second, we study how households
in different circumstances behave and also how their welfare changes across
taxation regimes. We then discuss the robustness of our ﬁndings.
10 Nakajima (2006) contains a useful description of the iterative scheme used here.
11 We simply multiply aggregate consumption C, capital K, and individual labor income wL
in that allocation by their respective tax rates.
12 Our use of the taxes estimated by Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and transfers estimated by
Floden and Linde (2001) implies that our measure of government consumption as a percentage of
output will not necessarily coincide with that obtained in the latter. However, in our benchmark,
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Tax Policy and Long-RunAggregates
Our ﬁndings for aggregate outcomes can be summarized as follows. First,
capital income taxes are unambiguously important for allocations. Second, a
regime of pure consumption taxation leads to the highest steady-state savings
rates among the alternatives we consider. Third, we ﬁnd that the increased
steady-state savings rates are, in turn, generally associated with substantially
larger capital stocks than the alternatives. Fourth, the implications of taxation
regime depend, in some cases strongly, on the level of income risk faced by
households. Table2presentsaggregatesummarydatafromboththehigh-and
low-risk economies.
We ﬁrst turn to a discussion of distortions to capital accumulation re-
sulting from differing tax regimes. Table 2 displays the over-accumulation
of capital that results from differing tax regimes under incomplete markets
as compared to the complete-markets case, denoted by KINC and KCM, re-
spectively. It is important to note, however, that KCM is calculated using the
effective interest rate implied by β and τk. That is, the over-accumulation,
KINC
KCM − 1, expressed in the tables takes the tax regime as given, and thus, is
a symptom of incomplete markets and the inability of households to com-
pletely insure themselves against risk. From this calculation, we observe that
regimes with no capital taxation result in less over-accumulation of capital,
especially in the low-risk economy. This implies that households are able
to insure themselves more fully through precautionary savings under policies
thatdonottaxreturnstocapital. Additionally,incomeriskmattersfortheway
in which households respond to pure consumption taxes. This can be seen by
noting that in the low-risk economy, households over-accumulate capital by
the smallest percentage under the pure consumption tax policy, while in the
high-risk economy, households over-accumulate by a large percentage under
the same regime. This further elucidates the role taxes play in an household’s
ability to insure itself against future risk.
Ignoring distributional issues, we now address the issue of whether pure
consumption taxation regimes yield large beneﬁts in terms of increased ag-
gregate output and consumption. The answer here is unambiguously “yes.”
In the long run, under both high- and low-income risk, pure consumption tax-
ation is associated with capital deepening, as measured by the capital-output
ratio on the order of 20 to 25 percent. This fact can also be seen in Figure
1, which shows the cumulative distribution of wealth under the various tax
regimes. Average long-run consumption is also higher across income-risk
categories and is made possible by the fact that the increased capital stock
does not require disproportionately greater resources to maintain.
However, it does not appear to be necessary to move to a strictly
consumption-based tax system to realize much of the gains from eliminat-
ing capital income taxes. In Table 2, we see that a regime of pure labor
income taxes has much the same effect when measured in terms of impact44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly



















































































on the capital stock, consumption, and output. That is, the intertemporal
distortion arising from capital taxation seems most signiﬁcant. Given the in-
tuitionprovidedattheoutsetforthedifferentialrisk-sharingpropertiesarising
from the two main alternatives to capital income taxes, the question now is, in
terms of aggregates, how large are these differences? The short answer here
is “not much.” In other words, pure labor income taxes and pure consumption
taxes yield broadly similar outcomes.
However, before concluding that consumption taxes are a “free lunch,”
there is one meaningful difference. The size of the increase in capital stock
arising from a move to pure consumption taxes is much larger when income
riskishigher. ThisisakeypointthatsuggeststhatnotalltheincreaseincapitalK. B. Athreya and A. L. Waddle: Alternatives to Capital Taxes 45
accumulation arising from a move to consumption taxes should be interpreted
as emerging from the removal of an intertemporal distortion to savings.
Wenowturntothedifferencescreatedbyusingconsumptiontaxesinstead
oflaborincometaxes. Thekeyﬁndingisthatcapitalover-accumulationgrows
substantially from the use of consumption taxes in the high-risk economy,
from approximately 30 to 38 percent, while it remains essentially constant,
at 14 percent, in the low-risk economy. This ﬁnding is a clear indicator that
consumptiontaxesindeedhaveundesirablerisk-sharingconsequences, which
households attempt to buffer themselves against.
Perhaps even more persuasive evidence for the increased risk to house-
holds created by consumption taxation is the fact that we calibrated the high-
and low-risk economies separately. In particular, we see from Table 1 that the
calibrateddiscountfactorinthehigh-andlow-riskeconomiesareβ = 0.9673
and β = 0.9557, respectively. This difference is greater than a full percent-
age point. To put the implications of the preceding into perspective, we check
what this means for the complete-markets capital level, KCM, which is cal-
culated to match the interest rate implied by β and τk. In percentage terms,
the ideal capital stock in the high-risk economy is around 15 percent smaller
than under the low-risk economy.13 Yet, despite this, the steady-state capital
stock under pure consumption taxes grows by 40 percent under high-income
risk, and by just 14 percent under low-income risk. Moreover, in Table 2, we
see that in absolute terms, the capital stock is substantially larger under pure
consumption taxes when income risk is high.
Studying the implications of consumption taxes for steady-state welfare
further clariﬁes the sense in which the “size” of the economy, as measured
by output, is a misleading measure of welfare gains. In particular, we see
ﬁrst that welfare gains from a move to consumption taxes under low-income
risk are substantial, at approximately $3,000 annually, or 7 percent of median
income. Further, this gain dwarfs the gains obtained from moving, in the low-
risk economy from the benchmark, to a pure labor income tax regime, which
is only about two-thirds as large ($1,927). The elimination of capital taxation
results in consumption increases in both economies. However, even though
the growth is larger in the high-risk economy, the welfare gains are smaller.
Intuitively, the risk created by consumption taxation demands a buffer
stock of savings of a size that depends crucially on the income risk that house-
holds face. The response of the size of the buffer stock can be seen in terms
of savings rates. Speciﬁcally notice that both the regime of pure consump-
tion taxes and the regime of pure labor income taxes generate almost identical
savings in the low-risk economy, but lead to a 2 percentage point (6 percent)





Benchmark .376 .352 .391
τc only .403 .359 .353
τl only .398 .352 .334
τc & τk .386 .361 .333
τl & τk .375 .351 .315
Low-Risk
Benchmark .251 .246 .348
τc only .241 .227 .375
τl only .281 .263 .371
τc & τk .227 .224 .353
τl & τk .258 .252 .346
increase in the high-risk economy relative to its nearest alternative, which is
the pure labor income tax.
In Table 3, we display both the standard deviation of consumption as
well as the coefﬁcient of variation of consumption, which is the ratio of the
standard deviation to the mean. The coefﬁcient of variation highlights the
consumptionriskassociatedwithagivenpolicy.14 Thesedatashowagainthat
increased aggregate output is not necessarily attributable to fewer distortions




contrast, in the low-risk economy, a move to a pure consumption tax yields
lower variation in consumption, both in absolute and relative terms. This
serves to further illustrate that the effects of tax policies depend in important
ways on the underlying income risk that households face.
Our results make clear that when choosing between the polar extremes of
pure labor taxes and pure consumption taxes, income risk must be taken into
account. Is the same warning applicable to more intermediate tax reforms
as well? To answer this, we study the effects arising from holding capital
incometaxesﬁxedattheirbenchmarklevelandmovingtoalternativeregimes,
which raise the remainder of revenues via only one of the two remaining
taxes. That is, we consider two alternatives: (1) τk = 0.397 and τl = 0 and
14 Speciﬁcally, for a mean-preserving proportional risk, multiplying the coefﬁcient of variation
of consumption by one-half of the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion yields the percentage of
mean consumption that a household would be willing to pay to avoid a unit increase in standard
deviation. See, for example, Laffont (1998, 22).K. B. Athreya and A. L. Waddle: Alternatives to Capital Taxes 47
(2) τk = 0.397 and τc = 0. In each of these cases, the remaining tax is set to
meet the government’s expenditure requirements.
Three ﬁndings are worth emphasizing. First, steady-state welfare under
regimes in which labor income taxes are eliminated are preferable to those in
whichconsumptiontaxesareeliminated. Thisistrueunderbothspeciﬁcations
of income risk. Once again, however, the gains from preserving consumption
taxes are much larger (roughly double) when income risk is low. Second,
under high-income risk, not only are the gains to eliminating labor income
taxes smaller, but also the gains themselves are, in large part, an artifact of the
increased buffer stock that households build up. This is seen in the substan-
tially larger capital stock associated with the “no-labor-tax” regime relative to
the “no-consumption-tax” regime.
Lastly,noticethatthoughallocationsundertheno-consumption-taxregime
are in some ways similar to the other allocations, the reliance in this case on a
combination involving a subset of the available tax instruments does worse in
welfare terms than the alternatives. That is, welfare-maximizing policies are
those that either (1) use one instrument alone, such as in the cases with pure
labor or consumption taxes, or (2) use all three instruments, such as in the
benchmark. We now turn to the effect of tax policies on the household-level
savingsdecisionsthatultimatelygeneratetheaggregatesdiscussedpreviously.
Household-Level Outcomes
Tax Policy and Changes in Savings
Having focused earlier on the response of economy-wide aggregates, we now
study a variety of subsets of households in order to understand the origins
of the aggregate responses. We ﬁrst discuss household savings behavior and
then turn to welfare. In Figures 2 and 3, we study the effects of changes in
policy on the amount of wealth accumulated in both the high- and low-risk
economies across income shocks. Notice, ﬁrst, that the two regimes in which
capital income taxes are eliminated, both generate the largest increases in
savings, which is consistent with the substantial growth of the capital stock
seen in the aggregate. Conversely, as long as capital income taxes are used
at all, savings rates do not deviate substantially from the benchmark. Notice,
though, that deviations from the benchmark at low levels of skill and wealth
are greatest for the case in which revenues are raised through labor taxes only.
However, it is still true that, on average, the level of savings is highest under
a consumption-tax-only regime. For those with low wealth, as seen for the
20th percentile of wealth, the response of savings rates to tax policy also is
more sensitive to current labor productivity (see Figure 3). Intuitively, for
low-wealth households, labor income is important in determining the current
budget, especially as these households cannot borrow.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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We also see that the current productivity shock received by the household
has very little effect on the response to policy changes for wealthy households
(inotherwords,thosethatareabovethemedianofthewealthdistribution). The
preceding is true regardless of current labor productivity. Additionally, even
for low-wealth households, the response to a change from the benchmark to
either of the two alternative policies with positive capital tax rates is relatively
unaffected by current productivity. For poorer households, however, savingsK. B. Athreya and A. L. Waddle: Alternatives to Capital Taxes 49
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does respond to the elimination of capital taxation. Speciﬁcally, in both the
high-andlow-riskeconomies, savingsratesunderpurelaborincometaxesare
relatively higher for low-productivity households than for high-productivity
households.
Consider next a switch from the benchmark to either of the two policies
under which consumption taxes are zero, that is, τl only and (τl,τk). In
these cases, the changes generated by making the policy switch are very small50 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
relative to the changes generated by a switch from the benchmark to the other
alternativetaxationregimes. Theintuitionforthisﬁndingisthatunderpolicies
featuring proportional labor income taxes, higher current productivity implies
that a larger amount of the household’s income is extracted to pay taxes. If
consumption is being smoothed, savings behavior will have to respond. Con-
versely, under policies that eliminate labor taxes altogether, those with high
productivity are proportionally richer than counterparts who face labor taxes
and, thus, are able to save and consume more. We also note the largest devi-
ations in savings from the benchmark arise for low-wealth households. The
intuition supporting this result is that low-wealth households are compara-
tively more affected by any increase or decrease in taxes because of their
inability to smooth consumption through the use of previously accumulated
wealth.
HouseholdWelfare
Turning now to the welfare consequences of the alternative tax policies, we
partition the population by wealth and current productivity. We study the wel-
fare gains or losses emerging from policy changes by computing the quantity
in (18) for households with each particular combination of current wealth and
productivity. The central implication of our welfare analysis is simple: the
welfare gains from a move to capital income taxes depend very strongly on
the level of income risk faced by households. In particular, we saw previously
that steady-state welfare gains from removing capital income taxes are much
largerunderlow-incomeriskthanunderhigh-incomerisk. Figure4showsthat
this difference arises from the fact that essentially all households beneﬁt more
fromsuchapolicyunderlow-incomeriskthanunderhigh-incomerisk. Inthis
sense, the distributional effects are somewhat simple to document. Speciﬁ-
cally, the order of magnitude of the welfare gains we ﬁnd is approximately 10
to 30 percent for various households under low-income risk, but only around
2 to 5 percent under high-income risk. This is particularly striking given that
capital stocks in the high-income risk economies are larger than those in the
low-income risk economies.
The insurance-related effects of pure consumption taxes can also be seen
becauseunderbothincomeprocesses,high-productivityhouseholdsgainmost
from the switch to pure consumption taxes. By contrast, the welfare effects
of labor income taxes turn out to depend on both productivity and wealth. In
particular, under low-income risk, the elimination of capital taxes seems more
important than the way in which the resulting revenue shortfall is ﬁnanced.
That is, households are essentially indifferent between a move to pure labor
incometaxesandaregimeofpureconsumptiontaxes. Insharpcontrast, high-
income risk leads households to prefer high labor income taxes when they
have low productivity, and to prefer high consumption taxes when they have
high labor productivity. This is precisely a result of smoothing behavior: theK. B. Athreya and A. L. Waddle: Alternatives to Capital Taxes 51
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income-poor consume more than their income, and income-rich, the reverse.
The high levels of income risk faced by households then lead them to prefer
to smooth their tax liability across states of the world.
When ordering households by their wealth holdings, we again see a diver-
gence between those who gain and those who lose from a pure consumption
tax. In the low-risk setting, the gains from moving to consumption (or la-
bor) taxation generate the largest gains for the wealthy. By contrast, under52 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
high-income risk, the gains accruing to wealthier households shrink system-
atically. Conversely, high-wealth households in the high-risk economy gain
morethantheirlower-wealthcounterpartsbecauseoftheswitchtoapurelabor
tax.
3. ROBUSTNESSAND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we studied the differential implications arising from two com-
monly proposed alternatives to capital income taxes. Our ﬁndings suggest
that consumption and labor income taxes have quite different effects and will
be viewed disparately by households that differ in both wealth and current
labor productivity. In terms of robustness, we focused exclusively on the role
played by uninsurable income risk, as the latter is a source of some contention
in the literature. However, our results may well depend on several additional
assumptions. Notably, our analysis is restricted to an inﬁnite-horizon setting.
A central issue that arises, therefore, is the ability of most (in other words, all
but the least fortunate) households to build up a substantial “buffer-stock” of
wealth, in the long run. This accumulation then renders the risk-sharing prob-
lem faced by households easier to confront. In this sense, the inﬁnite-horizon
setting, while convenient, may understate the hardship caused by uninsurable
risks. In particular, the polar opposite of the dynastic model is the pure life-
cycle model in which households care only about their own welfare, and not
at all about the welfare of their children. Under this view, the young will enter
life with no ﬁnancial wealth, and will, therefore, be very vulnerable to both
income shocks and tax systems that force them to pay large amounts when
young. In such a setting, high consumption taxes may be substantially more
painful than in our present model.
Amodelwithoverlappinggenerationswouldalsoallowustohighlightthe
intergenerational conﬂicts created by tax policy, something that our present
model cannot address. One speciﬁc issue that would then be possible to ad-
dress is that, at any given point in time, a switch to consumption taxation
away from income taxation would hurt those who had saved a great deal. In
a life-cycle model, this group would be, in general, relatively older. After
all, older households, especially if retired, earn little labor income, but con-
sume substantial amounts. Conversely, young households that have not saved
much will not oppose consumption taxes in the same way—especially if they
are currently consuming amounts less than their income (i.e., are saving for
retirement).
Inadditiontousingdynasties, wesimpliﬁedouranalysisbyemployingan
inelastic labor supply function. This is, of course, not necessarily innocuous.
Iftakenliterally,suchaspeciﬁcationwouldcallfora100percentlabortaxthat
was then rebated to households in a lump-sum payment. Immediately, risk
sharing would be perfect. Common sense strongly suggests that labor effort,K. B. Athreya and A. L. Waddle: Alternatives to Capital Taxes 53
even if inelastic over some ranges, would likely fall dramatically as tax rates
approached 100 percent. Thus, future work should remove this abstraction in
order to more accurately assess the costs of high tax rates.
More subtle, however, is the possibility that with elastic labor supply,
households have an additional means of smoothing the effects of productivity
shocks. That is, by working more when highly productive and less when not,
a household can more easily accumulate wealth and enjoy leisure. Recent
workofMarcet,ObiolsHoms,andWeil(forthcoming)andPijoan-Mas(2006)
argues that variable labor effort can be an important smoothing device. In
fact, Marcet, Obiols Homs, and Weil (forthcoming) even demonstrate that
the additional beneﬁt of being able to alter labor effort can lead to a capital
stock that is lower than the complete-markets analog. In turn, the impetus for
positive steady-state capital income taxes may simply disappear.
Lastly,throughoutourmodel,weprohibitedborrowing. Theexpansionof
creditseeninrecentyears(see, forexample, Edelberg2003andFurletti2003)
may now allow even low-wealth households to borrow rather than use taxable
labor income to deal with hardship. In turn, the tradeoffs associated with a
switch to consumption taxes will be altered. In ongoing work, we extend the
environment to allow for life-cycle wealth, nontrivial borrowing, and elastic
labor supply. Such an extension will, we hope, provide a more deﬁnitive view
of the consequences of alternatives to capital income taxation.
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